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Chapter I
Introduction

The term insurgency has evolved over the decades. Although synonymous with revolt and
rebellion, the term “insurgency” has a different connotation. According to Allswell Osini
Muzan:
…insurgency is one objective of organized terrorism, terrorism is one of several
strategies of insurgency. Both terrorism and insurgency may be used by states in
their internal and foreign policy operations. Terrorism and terrorist tactics
constitute part of the strategies and tactics of insurgency.1

Terrorism is a contested concept. While there are many national and regional definitions,
there is no universal legal definition approved by the General Assembly of the United
Nations (the one proposed by the Security Council in Res. 1566 (2004) is non-binding,
lacking legal authority in international law). The Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism of the 6th
(legal) Committee of the General Assembly has, with some interruptions, been trying to reach
a legal definition since 1972 - but in vain. In the absence of a legal definition, attempts have
been made since the 1980s to reach agreement on an academic consensus definition.2
According to Glenn Greenwald:
The application of the term "Terrorist" by the U.S. Government has nothing to do with how that
term is commonly understood, but is instead exploited solely as a means to punish those who defy
U.S. dictates and reward those who advance American interests and those of its allies3
The definition of terrorism as compiled by Alex P. Schmid states terrorism:

Is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property in
order to coerce or intimidate a government or the civilian population in
furtherance of political or social objectives.4
1
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Whereas rebellion can be violent and non-violent, thus, necessarily unlawful, insurgency
usually goes beyond civil resistance and implies armed resistance to the authority in
Government. In most cases, insurgency is considered illegitimate by Governments since it
threatens its sovereignty. Insurgency may take different forms and can last over many years.
Historically, many countries around the world, including the United States, France and
Germany, experienced periods of insurgency.5 Oftentimes, insurgency is a natural response of
the people to the ineffective and schismatic policies or blatant iniquities of corrupt,
oppressive governments. Such insurgents may gain the support of the international
community who are sympathetic to their cause for a regime change. For instance,
insurgencies which are the result of oppressive Governments who infringe on the rights of its
citizens and commit international human right violations most often than not get the support
of the international community. The international response to the situation in Libya during the
2011 revolution saw an international outcry by the UN which prompted a NATO intervention.
This resulted in the toppling the Gaddafi regime.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, however, insurgency usually borders on terrorism.6 To some
commentators such as I. C Achumba and O. S Ighomereho the two terms may be
interchangeable, but it is not always the case. 7 Unlike terrorists, insurgents may pursue their

The American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), also known as the American War of Independence.
The French Revolution was a period of far-reaching social and political upheaval in France that lasted from
1789 until 1799. The revolutions of 1848–49 in the German states, the opening phase of which was also called
the March Revolution
5
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political goals without intimidating civilians. Whereas insurgents seek to hamstrung positions
of the national Government, terrorists are not loath to kill innocent civilians in the process.
Boko Haram, as one of the most fearsome militant groups in Sub-Saharan Africa qualifies
more for the definition of a terrorist group rather than an insurgent army. Yet, there is a
tendency in the academic circles to regard the recent offshoot of Boko Haram’s violent
activities as the Boko Haram Insurgency.8 Hence, the discussion in this paper will proceed
from the position that Boko Haram is terrorist group.
Emerging in 2002, Boko Haram originally known as Jamāʿat ahl al-Sunnah li-Daʿwah
wal-Jihād - meaning “people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teachings and
jihād”9 was nowhere close to being an insurgent group. Although the fledgling group
embraced the revolutionary idea of establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria, it conducted its
activities peacefully. Boko Haram’s members saw western education – the epitome of
Nigeria’s secularism and growing westernization – as the main threat to the Islamization of
the country. Having consolidated some support from the masses, Boko Haram embarked on
the path of insurgency in 2009, unleashing carnage on Governmental agents and innocent
civilians. In 2012, Boko Haram evidence indicates that the sect collaborated with Al-Qaeda in
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which suggests the sect, had international affiliation with AlQaeda.10 By 2015, the militant faction pledged allegiance to ISIS11. This also brought about a
change of name by the group to al-Wilāyat al-Islāmiyya Gharb Afrīqiyyah meaning Islamic
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State West Africa Province, ISWAP.12 This shift of allegiance could be attributed not only
due to the declining fortunes and influence of Al-Qaeda caused by the death of Osama Bin
Laden, the similar mode of operations between ISIS and the Boko Haram, but ultimately
there was a bigger financial benefit to Boko Haram as ISIS was reportedly worth $2 billion as
of 2014.13 Boko Haram leads deadly insurgency against the Nigerian Government, with death
tolls constantly escalating and the area of its conflict broadening. As globalization brought
about an increase in interaction between countries, terrorists groups also have seized the
opportunity to extend their influence into several territories. Pillar says the process of
international integration and development that came with globalization and brought about
easy and legitimate movement of people and money across borders, also benefit terrorism14.
Thus in 2014, Boko Haram spread its tentacles into the adjacent countries of Chad, Niger and
Cameroon.15 For the purposes of this paper, however, Boko Haram’s activity in Nigeria will
be discussed and analyzed.
This project begins with an introduction surging into the objective and research
questions, the second chapter gives a background information on Nigeria including literature
review of the existing academic literature on the topic, focusing on credible academic sources
such as journals, articles and books. The third chapter discusses the conceptual and
theoretical framework including the description of the methodological approach employed for
the purposes of this project. The fourth chapter examines Boko Haram strategy and segues
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into a discussion of counterinsurgency measures that could be taken to contain the threats
emanating from Boko Haram and the need for the rethinking of counterinsurgency. The last
chapter concludes the project and highlights policy recommendations.
1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY:

The Southern and Northern states have been a hub for militancy. The South, which
constitutes a Christian majority population16 has also witnessed militancy from groups such
as the O'odua People’s Congress (OPC), Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta
(MEND), and The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
(MASSOB). OPC is a Yoruba ethnic movement that sort to defend the interests of the Yoruba
people to have more autonomy for the ethnic group. Some of its actives included
intimidation, attacking other ethnic groups, killed police officers, extort money and engaged
in human rights abuses.17
As for MEND its origins in the Ijaw ethnic minority group dispersed across the coastal states
of the Niger Delta, MEND is the biggest and most dangerous of all resistance groups to have
emerged from the Niger Delta.18 According to MEND and its supporters, it attacks oil
facilities in the Niger Delta, which is fueled by ethnic grievances over environmental damage
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Campbell, A. J. (n.d.). Why Nigeria's North South Distinction Is Important. Retrieved June 29, 2016, from
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and political neglect.19 Some of their activities also involved attacking the Nigerian security
forces and their facilities.20
The objective of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
(MASSOB) was calling for a cessation of the Biafra region from Nigeria. Apart from the civil
war (1967-71), some of their activities included engaging the Nigerian army in warfare.21
Boko Haram in the Northern region being the primary and most formidable militant group.
Boko Haram’s activities have affected not only the Northern part of the country, but the entire
nation. At the same time, its activities threaten Nigeria’s neighboring countries. The problem
Nigeria faces, albeit largely internal, have become a threat to global security due to the
tendencies of the insurgency and its effects spilling into neighboring countries and
destabilizing the region. This highlights the importance of exploring the counterinsurgency
measures adopted by Nigeria to contain Boko Haram and potentially rid itself from the
extremist group.
Given the problem described above, the overarching objective of this project is to review and
assess the failure of the Nigerian central Government’s effort to stop the deadly depredations
of the Boko Haram insurgent group in Nigeria. Another related objective of the project is to
consider new counterinsurgency tactics that could be taken to defeat this daunting extremist
group.

Pham, J. (2007). The Battle for Nigeria. The National Interest, (88), 97-100. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/42896020
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1.2 PROJECT QUESTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TOPIC:

The failure of the counter-insurgent activities initiated by the Nigerian Government
means that the people of Nigeria, especially those in the North-Eastern region, will continue
to suffer at the hands of this seemingly determinant terrorist group. Even though the regional
coalition of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad had decapitated the Islamic State of West
Africa Province – a self-proclaimed caliphate in the territories controlled by Boko Haram –
and liberated these territories by March 2015, the group continues its subversive activities.22
It has proved more intransigent and more resilient than all other militant groups in Nigeria’s
history. If the group continues its gruesome activities, this could lead not only to the failure of
governance in Nigeria but also to greater regional instability. Likewise, uninterrupted Boko
Haram’s activities could trigger a stampede of Nigerian people abroad. Many could try to flee
to safety to other countries and continents including Europe, thereby compounding the
current refugee crisis in Europe. Hence, the need to study the group’s tactics and activities is
critical. It could also help to better understand possible strategies to finally end it.
Given the problem as it has been described in above paragraphs, the project questions are the
following: to what extent did the President Jonathan led administration’s counter-insurgency
measures were effective in their fight against Boko Haram? What other counter-insurgency
options the Buhari-led Government adopt to defeat Boko Haram? Why is Boko Haram
resilient?

22
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON NIGERIA:
The late 19th century should be taken as a starting point for this discussion. This is because
the current problem facing Nigeria began during this period. In the late 19th century, Nigeria
experienced remarkable changes. Thus, in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, the British
Empire – largely unmatched in its power – expanded into Africa. By 1901, the British Empire
established formal control over the territories making up today’s Nigeria.23 In 1914, the
British united these territories into a single political entity – the Colony and Protectorate of
Nigeria – despite the fact that they were populated by different ethnical groups.24 Nigeria was
artificially created. In the ensuing decades, this façade of national solidarity would need to be
artificially maintained. Nigeria’s independence in 1960 was a well anticipated thing, as it was
preceded by a decade of nationalistic fervor across Africa.
Following independence, representatives of the three largest ethnic groups of Nigeria
gained roughly equal representation in the federal Government. Yet, tensions amid these
ethnic groups – and, most perceptibly, between Muslim conservatives in the North and
Christian Igbos and Yorubas in the South – reached apogee repeatedly in the ensuing decades,
culminating with civil war and inter-ethnic conflicts.25 As the two factions disagreed over the
constitutional order in the country, over the form of Government and over other similar
issues, secessionist moods cropped up across the country. The country had been gripped by
mayhem for several decades following independence. The British had kept all of Nigeria’s
250-odd diverse and antagonistic tribes under the jackboot, whereas the independent Federal

Falola, T., & Jean-Jacques, D. (2015). Africa: An encyclopaedia of culture and society. Santa Barbara, CA:
ABC-CLIO.
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Government failed to accomplish this task.26 With only temporary respites from civil war,
instability (ethnic and religious), military coup d'état and counter coup lasted in Nigeria well
into the 1990s. This created an ideal breeding ground for insurgent and terrorist groups.
It wasn’t until 1999 that democracy was restored in Nigeria. From the perspective of
consulted experts, it is surprising Nigeria emerged from this protracted period of internal
fighting and instability unscathed. The country’s democracy began to rejuvenate and
economic development began to surge. Yet, economic development was largely insufficient to
compensate for the lost momentum. Similarly, the country remained permeated with
corruption. Growing democratization, by contrast, did not appeal to all members of society,
especially to the hidebound fundamentalists in the North. It was against this background that
the ideology of the new group – Boko Haram – began to resonate with the ever growing
number of people.
2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW

It would be logical to begin this section with a general characteristic of the existing literature.
Academic sources describes the insurgency of Boko Haram to have heightened the state of
insecurity in Nigeria.27 Samu states that Boko Haram insurgency is due to the revulsion to
corruption of secular authorities. They believe that because the Nigerian government does not
hold to account, the offenders who are elite engaged in corruption and also other injustices,
inequities among the Nigerian people. With these doctrines, they gathered the interest of the
disgruntled. Others see this violent rejectionist ideology as the actual cause of the Boko
Haram conflict.28

26

ibid

Maiangwa, B., Uzodike, U., Whetho, A., & Onapajo, H. (2012). “Baptism by Fire”: Boko Haram and the
Reign of Terror in Nigeria. Africa Today, 59(2), 41-57. doi:1. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africatoday.59.2.41 doi:1
27
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There are multitude of literature dedicated to analyzing the problem with some
suggesting that Africa is more likely to house terrorists because of lack of proper security and
surveillance; For example, Sambisa forest in Nigeria constitutes a physical safe haven due to
the State’s lack a suitable legal framework to prosecute terrorists.29 Likewise, there is a
wealth of articles on Boko Haram’s activity in scholarly journals. After the extra judicial
killing of the sect’s founding leader Muhammad Yusuf in 2009; there has been great clashes
with Nigerian security personnel, their offices and innocent lives became prime target for the
sects in retaliation to the murder of Yusuf.30 The main objective of the sect is to undermine
the powers of the Nigerian government and eventually toppling it, and then replacing it with
their own version of Islamic government. For the purposes of this project, the most recent
sources of information have been selected.
The majority of authors consulted for the purposes of this project agree that Boko
Haram is a violent terrorist organization. Likewise, the overwhelming majority of the authors
condemn the activities of Boko Haram.31 In a lead up to the famous kidnapping of the Chibok

STUDY [Scholarly project]. In Academic.edu. Retrieved August 01, 2016, from
http://www.academia.edu/6777526/BOKO_HARAM_CONFLICT_RESEARCH_ANAYSIS_and_MANAGEM
ENT_PREVENTIVE_COUNTERTERRORISM_AND_SUSTAINABLE_PEACEBUILDING_NIGERIA_AN
D_BOKO_HARAM_CASE_STUDY
29
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30
Animasawun, G. (2012). The Military and Internal Security Operations in Nigeria's Fourth Republic:
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Girls in April 2014, thus between February 2013 to February 2014, Boko Haram carried at
least 13 terrorist attacks which claimed more than 300 lives including civilians and military
personnel.32 There is similar agreement among the authors concerning the fact that the group
has been increasingly drifting ruthlessness since it settled on the path of insurgency in 2009.
From the perspective of Walker, “it is difficult to see how there can be meaningful dialogue
between the Government and the group”. He maintains that dialogue is impossible not only
because the group is rogue, but also because “there would be no guarantee that someone
speaking for the group is speaking for all of its members.” 33
The root cause of the aggression of Boko Haram needs to be addressed and tackled,
According to Nwakudu, the nation of Nigeria a secular country designed by alien occupiers.
Both under British rule and following the proclamation of independence in the mid-20th
century, the Nigerian populace continued to suffer at the hands of the fledgling country’s
military leaders. 34 According to Maier, this makes the Nigerian nation akin to a bruised and
battered elephant. Maier adds that today this elephant is staggering towards an abyss with the
ground crumbling under its feet. “Should it fall, the impact will shake the rest of West
Africa,” Maier maintains.35 Although Maier indicates several different reasons why Nigeria is

Leiden, Netherlands: African Studies Centre
Bouchat, C. (2013). The causes of instability in Nigeria and implications for the United
States. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press.
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stuttering in social and political terms, he implies that the activities of Boko Haram constitute
one of the major threats.
Again, both Maier and other authors note that the emergence of Boko Haram is
attributable to more deep-running reasons. One of these reasons, Montclos (2014) explains, is
that Nigeria has become – due to historical reasons – a patchwork of tribes, ethnicities and
two large religious groups: Muslims and Christians. Thus making it a heterogeneous country
with diverse interests and susceptible to conflicts.

Comolli further explains that the attempts

of the British overlords and later Nigeria’s ruling class to westernize the country have
incurred the wrath of many people, so that the emergence of a powerful insurgent movement
became a matter of time.36 Unsurprisingly, the consulted authors assert, the Nigerian people
from all walks of life have been openly questioning the ability of Nigerian leaders to preserve
the country intact.37 These people have also indulged in doubts concerning whether Nigeria
should stay autonomous or discard the old colonial borders, leading to the disintegration of
the nation into several smaller and – importantly – more homogenous nations.38 Without the
leadership working to ally the existing ethnic and religious prejudices, the ideology of the
insurgent Boko Haram group will have a chance of falling on fertile soil in Nigeria. Similarly,
chauvinism runs rampant in many parts of Nigeria and remains part of the global
phenomenon playing out in a host of other African nations.39 Another related factor that
contributes to the blossoming of Boko Haram in Nigeria is the politicized tribalism found in
the country and elsewhere globally. According to Deutscher & Lindsey, this remains one of

36

Comolli, V. (2015). Boko Haram: Nigeria’s Islamist insurgency. Oxford, UK: Oxford

University Press.
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the most significant threats to internal stability in Nigeria and in the wider region. In the same
vein, Deutscher & Lindsey add:
With ever growing frequency, wars are fought not between states
but within them. The conflict is neighbor against neighbor, us
against them, always the menacing other, whether the differences
are racial, religious, or linguistic. What solutions have the nations
of the world discovered for such problems? … The answer to that
question is complex and multifaceted.40

There is overwhelming agreement among the consulted authors that these factors lead
to the strengthening of Boko Haram’s positions in Nigeria. It is within these parameters that
Boko Haram continues to thrive.
A common thread from the reviewed literature also suggests that counterinsurgency
against terrorism is not working at its full potential in case of Boko Haram in Nigeria. The
Government battle against this dangerous group of deadly militants contributes to incessant
soaring of the death toll, making it apparent that the current counterinsurgency tactics in
Nigeria are ineffective in their basic function. This is evident in Boko Haram’s ability to
control 14 local Government areas, estimated to be about 30, 000 km2 or the size of Belgium.
Around this time, that is 2014 about 10,000 lives were lost. 41 Moreover, even as the military
stepped up its operations against the insurgency, more villages and towns were lost. Images
of Nigerian troops retreating from these towns, seeking refuge in neighboring countries and
abandoning caches of arms and munitions, were hard evidence that the military campaign
was failing.

40
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The authors opine that the approach employed by the Nigerian counterinsurgency
groups targets not only Boko Haram insurgents but also civilians.42 Peaceful civilians die
either because of desultory crossfire43 or because of the faulty tip-off by the intelligence.44
Because of this, the Nigerian people lose their confidence in the counterinsurgency
operations. Spooner agrees with this point, elaborating that the confidence of the Nigerian
people in the tactics of their security forces is sagging, because Boko Haram continues its
activities with a great sense of impunity.45
Statistics provided by Spooner show that the two most successful strategies in
containing insurgent activities and decreasing fatality of these insurgent activities by as much
as 80% since the 1960s have been a political process and effective policing. On the contrary,
Spooner argues, when nations use military force to contain insurgents, the effectiveness of
such counterinsurgency operations is dramatically lower and occasional fatalities
substantially higher.46 Other authors do not make such peremptory declarations, and some
even aver that the use of force is, in fact, the most virile and the most productive
Bouchat, C. (2013). The causes of instability in Nigeria and implications for the United States. Carlisle
Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press.
42
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counterinsurgency approach47 Most of the consulted authors, however, tend to concur in
Spooner’s suggestion that policing and political improvements bode well for the purposes of
counterinsurgency.48 This brings forward the fundamental point of this report:
counterinsurgency tactics must use both short-term approaches like use of force and longterm approaches like political changes.
Importantly, it appears from the reviewed literature that the efforts of Governments in
stopping militant activities domestically can reach fruition only when they are linked to the
causal factors of terrorist attacks.49 Montclos agrees with this point, adding that Governments
need to take proactive measures to address the root cause of the terrorism in order to make its
counterinsurgency operation fruitful.50
Authors seeking to explain the reasons why the counterinsurgency operations initiated
by the Nigerian Government have failed to destroy Boko Haram contend the militant
organization owes its viability to widespread poverty, illiteracy and ramshackle governance.
Spooner, for one, explains that Nigeria is plagued with poverty. From his perspective, the

47
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organization has managed to recruit nearly 9,000 disaffected youths from the poorest regions
of Nigeria by manipulating with their grievances and frustrations.51 In fact, the 12 Northern
states of Nigeria where Boko Haram is most active are the most destitute in Nigeria. Poverty
level is twice as higher as that nationwide and child malnutrition is four times greater than in
the rest of the nation. The unemployed and disaffected youths, youths under purported
religious guidance called Alamajiris, and/or homeless youths are the typical Boko Haram
members. 52
Agbu, Beckett, and Spooner, agree that the Nigerian Government has attempted to
take the abovementioned information in consideration when it was developing new
counterinsurgency plans.53 The Nigerian Government has launched a new counterterrorism
strategy which emphasizes a non-military approach and places more emphasis on community
engagement and education. Called “Counter-radicalization”, the program has also put an
emphasis on de-radicalization, empowerment, and job creation.54 Nonetheless, such correct
steps by the Nigerian Government addressing the root causes of terrorist activities of the
Boko Haram insurgent group are not fully exploited and, hence, do not bring tangible
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results.55 An example of the counter-radicalization is the initiative by the Jonathan
administration to reform the almajiri educational system to integrate them into the formal
school system. This initiative failed due to lack proper funding and monitoring.56 Thus far,
military force has taken precedence over political solutions to the underlying problems.57
The brief overview of academic literature adduced above will serve as a preliminary
knowledge basis for further research. It is presented here for the purposes of introducing the
reader with the general trends in academic research on the Boko Haram insurgency and the
Nigerian Government’s counterinsurgency measures. In the course of writing this project, the
reviewed sources of information will be used repeatedly. Importantly, however, the list of
sources used will range beyond those referenced in this literature review.
2.2. DEMOGRAPHICS OF NIGERIA

It is apparent from the previous subsection that Nigeria is an artificially created entity with a
very diverse ethnic composition. Broadly speaking, all Nigerian tribes and ethnicities can be
divided into several pigeonholes. Thus, the Fulbe and the Hausa – with the vast majority of
them being Muslim – are the largest ethnic groups in the country’s North (see Figure 2). The
Igbo, the overwhelming majority of whom are Christian, constitute the most numerous ethnic
group in the country’s east (see Figure 2). The Yoruba – with the ratio of Christians to
Muslims being about one to one – are predominant in the South-West of the country (see
Figure 2). Percentagewise, the Hausa account for about 21% of the country’s total population,
the Yoruba – for another 21%, the Igbo – for 18%, and the Fulani – for 9%.58 The remaining
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31% are a patchwork of minority groups. The ratio of Muslims to Christians is in favor of
Muslims: about 50% to 40%, with the rest professing some of the various indigenous
beliefs.59 The exact ratio is different to pinpoint, because the situation constantly changes.
Indeed, The pew survey estimated that Nigeria’s Muslims accounted for 75% of the
population in 2009, only to estimate two years later that 51% of the country’s population
were now Christians.60 In any case, an important thing about the Nigerian Muslims is that the
majority of them are Sunnis.
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Figure 1. Diffusion of Nigeria’s ethnic groups across the country. Naija Viral. Retrieved from
http://www.naijaviral.com/6-interesting-facts-about-nigeria/

Interethnic tensions in the country continue to intensify in part because of the ever
growing population. Growing at a rate between 1.67% at pre-independence to 2.63% in 2016.
The countries population is expected to surpass the USA by 2050.61 Figure 2 below shows
that the country’s population is poised to swell to 400 million by 2045.

Figure 2. Nigeria’s population growth. The Economist. Retrieved from
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21613341-make-it-big-africa-business-mustsucceed-nigeria-continents-largest-market-no
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Indeed, as the country’s population balloons, it increases the strain on natural
resources and only compounds the country’s socioeconomic problems. Urbanization is below
the world levels, but nonetheless puts a considerable strain on amenities in the cities.
A large percentage of those consulted for the purposes of this project have opined that
Nigeria’s diverse ethnic groups naturally have different visions of the country’s development,
because they lack a sense of national unity and patriotism for Nigeria. Gordon agrees with
this point, adding that as the outgrowth of British colonial conquest, Nigeria does not reflect
the “affiliations and sentiments of the people living there”.62Some do not accept the concept
of Nigeria at all. It is unsurprising that Boko Haram has been able to emerge and thrive in
such an environment.

2.3. SLIPSHOD GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA

Before analyzing Governance in Nigeria, it is necessary to state that governing a country like
Nigeria is not an easy task. Central Government is often dominated by some ethnic group,
which is indifferent to the problems of other ethnic groups. According to Campbell
“Managing the complex web of interests and identities has challenged governance since
colonial times”.63 According to Obaje, “a total of 774 local Government councils are
recognized in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”.64 Nigeria is a federal
republic. Devolution of powers by the central Government to the provinces can both be good
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or bad. In developed countries, federalization is often seen as an antidote against secessionist
sentiments. Indeed, as some of the academics have averred, federalization is part of the
reasons why a diverse country like Nigeria has managed to preserve its colonial borders. Yet,
some experts have also surmised that federalization also decreases the influence of the central
Nigerian Government in the regions. As a result, it can neither fully implement
socioeconomic reforms in these regions nor tackle the problem of insurgency on all levels.
Importantly, Nigeria had spent most of the late 20th century under military rule. In
these circumstances, the Government was straddled with the task of preserving the country
rather than developing its democratic institutes or economic capabilities. Some of the
consulted experts have also expressed an opinion that those military Governments did not
even care much about the country’s socioeconomic development. They failed to ride growing
oil prices to socioeconomic prosperity. Naturally, the failures of the consecutive Governments
to bring about positive changes pestered many Nigerians and contributed to the emergence of
various insurgent groups.
Boko Haram was one of such groups. However, throughout the 2000s, Boko Haram did not
embark on the path of intimidation and insurgency. The reasons are simple: Presidents
Olusegun Obasanjo, who ruled the country from 1999 to 2007, and his successor Umaru
Musa Yaradua, who ruled the country until 2010, enjoyed immense support in the North of
the country and were seen to be fighting corruption. For instance, President Obasanjo was
instrumental in the impeachment, arrest and subsequent jailing of Diepreye Alamieyeseigha
former governor of Bayelsa State over embezzlement of state funds.65 Another example is the
arrest of Tafa Balogun, former Inspector General of Police over corruption and money
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laundering.66 Although the fight against corruption suffered a somewhat set back during
Yar’adua’s presidency there were nonetheless several high profile corruption cases. In 2008,
Minister of Health and her deputy including several senior officials of the Ministry were
arraigned before court over allegations of sharing of N300 million ($2.5M USD) belonging to
the Ministry. Another high profile corruption case is the persecution of Michael Botmang,
former governor of Plateau state for allegedly stealing N1.6 billion ($13.4M USD).67 Several
bank executives were also persecuted over bank scandals involving loans in 2009.68 The
Muslim-dominated North was, in fact, an electoral fief for each of these presidents.
Secondly President Olusegun Obasanjo who is a retired army general and a former
Head of State was seen as a strongman who ruthlessly dealt with any form of opposition at its
infancy under the pretext of National Security. Thirdly while corruption was present in both
administrations its level was not as glaring when compared with the successive Government.
Lastly the insurgent group was wise not to confront the Government as its membership was
insignificant and it was still recruiting.
Boko Haram did not care much about threadbare economic policies of these
presidents’ administrations as long as their recruitment and indoctrination continued. The
adoption of the Shariah law in 1999 in some of the Northern States, for example, served the
interests of fundamental Islamists just fine. In 2010, after the death of President Yar’adua, his
vice, Gudluck Jonathan became president. During the latter’s regime economic grievances
and frustrations came to play a greater role in fomenting Boko Haram’s sedition and
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insurgency. As will be shown in the next subchapter, President Jonathan failed to bring about
any meaningful changes in many areas of the country’s development. According to those
consulted, this failure has only fanned the fires of insurgency across the country. It must
however be reiterated that Boko Haram started its insurgent activities during Yar’adua’s era
2.4. SOCIOECONOMIC CHALLENGES: DISPARITIES BETWEEN NIGERIA’S NORTH AND SOUTH

Slipshod Governance under consecutive Nigerian administrations and especially under
President Gudluck Jonathan has translated into persistent socioeconomic problems. One of
the reasons why the Government has failed to improve socioeconomic conditions in the
country, experts agree, is because of the deeply entrenched corruption. This reasoning also
finds an echo with some of the consulted authors.69 Indeed, just as the previous
administrations, Jonathan’s administration was loath to lance the boil of corruption. Under
President Jonathan, the situation surrounding corruption has only worsened in Nigeria. Rather
tellingly, the Jonathan administration did not persecute many of the corruption cases
involving top officials. The corruption cases ranged from pension scam, fuel subsidy scandal,
and the infamous missing $20 billion.70 Many authors argue that corruption is one of the
reasons why the authorities have failed to staunch the Boko Haram insurgency.71 In part,
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because of stifling corruption on the Governmental level, ordinary Nigerians have been
largely unable to share in the benefits of the country’s envious economic growth.
According to a general perception amongst Nigerians, a big failure of the Jonathan
administration was that it abandoned many regions of the country. Even though the South
was Jonathan’s electoral fief in 2011 (see Figure 3) the president neglected these parts of the
country in many respects. The federal Government was nearly absent in this region, watching
as many federal projects collapsed. Recent information from the current Government
indicates that in the last 16 years of the PDP led Government including the Jonathan
administration did not complete any of their commissioned projects. Thus successive
Governments kept on awarding contracts while those already being awarded remain
uncompleted. The reason for this is corruption.72 In the South, the second Niger Bridge--an
important project that would link the South-East and South-South- with potential socioeconomic benefits was abandoned by President Jonathan.73 Also in the North, the federal
Government neglected many important projects, which could otherwise create jobs and youth
empowerment in the region. An example is the dredging of River Niger initiated by late
President Yar’adua and abandoned his immediate successor, President Jonathan.74 The federal
Government also failed to attract major investment to this region, prompting many Nigerians
to refer to the North as “the sick man of the country” or as “the economic backwaters of
Nigeria”.
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Figure 3. North-south electoral divide in Nigeria. Council on Foreign Relations. Retired from
http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2011/04/20/nigeria-credible-elections-reinforce-the-divide/

Importantly, while many of the socioeconomic problems – including power shortages
and armed robberies – are common both to Nigeria’s Southerners and Northerners, the divide
between these two areas of the country is yawning.75 Apparently, the divide is most
perceptible on the ethnic level, playing out during each election. For example, as can be seen
from Figure 3, whereas Southern Nigeria voted overwhelming for Gudluck Jonathan a
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Christian from the South in 2011, Northern Nigeria voted with near unanimity for a Northern
Muslim candidate – Muhammadu Buhari.
Most important, the divide between Nigeria’s North and South is perceptible in more
critical and down-to-earth areas of socioeconomic life than national elections. Likewise, as
Tolu Ogunlesi of The New York Times puts it, overemphasizing a “Muslim-Christian divide
obscures ethnic, linguistic and class divisions that are at the root of many of the problems in
this patchwork country”.76 John Campbell of The Huffington Post agrees with this statement,
further adding that violent clashes in Nigeria rarely have a religious component. Campbell
uses socioeconomic factors to further explain the nature of the insurgency in Nigeria:
The south is far richer and boasts far better socioeconomic indicators than
the north. Extensive oil reserves are located in the Niger delta, and the
south has Lagos, the commercial and media capital of the country… The
two largest ethnic groups, the Yoruba and the Igbo [concentrated in the
south], make up the majority of the diaspora that provides increasingly
important foreign exchange remittances from abroad.77

Some of the experts consulted have voiced an opinion that socioeconomic factors like
poverty, illiteracy, underdevelopment and bad governance in Nigeria’s North play a larger
role in fueling the Boko Haram insurgency than religious divisions do. They also pointed to
greater illiteracy levels in the North of the country. Ali-Akpajiak and Pyke too, note that
geographical disparities in literacy levels exist across the country. More specifically, they
argue that literacy rates are 22% for females and 42% for males in the North of the country,
while they are typically 20% higher for Southerners.78Although things have improved
somewhat since the publication of Akpajiak and Pyke’s book, the overall tendency is
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similarly alarming. As the widely detested Jonathan administration failed to improve literacy
rates and to tackle other socioeconomic woes, Boko Haram’s leadership had no problems
with recruiting new members. The Jonathan administration lost touch with the common
masses, forlornly trying to contain the Boko Haram insurgency with military measures alone.
Even with the colossal budget (see Figure 4) allocated to the security apparatus to fight the
Boko Haram insurgency, many officers complained of being underequipped leading to the
mutiny of some army officers.79 The National Security Advisor was involved in the
embezzlement of $2.1 billion in funds meant for the fight against Boko Haram.
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Chapter 3
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Explaining the chaotic evolution of Boko Haram with one single theory would be
problematic. Likewise, attributing the evolution of Boko Haram to just one particular cause
would be reductionist. Indeed, as it will be shown repeatedly throughout the project, Nigerian
and international commentators adduce different factors to explain the outbreak of Boko
Haram’s insurgency. Hence, to understand the root causes of the group’s insurgency and,
consequently, to be able to make recommendations for successful counterinsurgency, it would
be appropriate to find theories that can explain the origins of the crisis. Experts have applied
many theories to study the problem. Ted Gurr 197080, for one, has utilized the relative
deprivation theory, which posits that political violence arises from the differences in
socioeconomic circumstances of individuals. In his book, Gurr provides clear links between
socioeconomic deprivation on the one hand and political violence on the other. Published
originally in 1970, Gurr’s treatise has become a widely-cited classic. In similar argument
Hafez 2003 explained:
Feelings of deprivation result in anger and anxiety that make ordinary
people susceptible to aggression and rebellion. Although Gurr’s model
introduces a number of intervening variables, such as “dissident
institutional support” and “regime institutional support”, the defining
feature of his approach remains the frustration-aggression nexus.81
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Hafez also added two other factors that – in addition to economic deprivation – breed
insurgency: structural transformations and social alienation.
David J. Kilcullen believes that the war on terrorism is actually a campaign against a
globalized Islamist insurgency. Thus, counter-insurgency strategies and tactics need updating
to deal with a globalized movement like al-Qaeda, especially increasing participation and
cooperation of many states' intelligence and police agencies.82
Regarding terrorism as an integral part of insurgency, which is often the case with
Boko Haram, other theorists add psychological causes to the prevalence of insurgency. For
example, Neuburger, Valentini, and Hughes averred: “A terrorist does not simply weigh risks
against the likelihood of success, as is normally the case, but adds into equation the abstract
value of the cause for which he or she is fighting”.83 This is exactly the reason, Neuburger,
Valentini and Hughes contend why traditional notions of deterrence do not usually work
against such insurgents. Although these notions may be contested, it is evident in the Nigerian
President Jonathan administration’s imposition of states of emergency and its subsequent
extension in the North-East in an attempt to curb its activities. However, this military
intervention did not yield the desired result. The state of emergency was first declared in May
2013 and was extended six month later in the same year.84
Explaining the root causes of Boko Haram’s emergence and the counterinsurgency
measures with the theories mentioned above would provide some valuable insight. Social
movement theory is one example of a theory that could also be used to reinforce this
theoretical framework. The most prudent decision, however, would be to use an integrated,
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multi-dimensional theoretical approach. Thus, in addition to the mentioned theories, religious
fundamentalism theory and theory of poverty and social alienation could be utilized to enrich
the theoretical framework.
According to Welshman, the central tenet of the poverty and social alienation theory
is that poverty breeds conflict.85 Indeed, the idea that poverty contributes to social
dissatisfaction and, hence, some sort of social action has been cited and repeated so often that
it has assumed the aura of conventional wisdom. What is not as well known is that poverty,
when combined with other factors, can contribute dramatically to the rise of violent resistance
to Governmental actions. Likewise, the theory of poverty and social alienation recognizes the
role of other related factors – including illiteracy and bad Governmental management of these
and other socioeconomic woes – in generating insurgency.86
The theory of religious fundamentalism, for its part, entwines religion with politics. It
links religion to repression, explaining that the rejection of the western interpretation of
freedom motivates fundamentalists to action. One of the chief assumptions of the theory is
that fundamentalists see western values as inimical to their societies and are ready to embrace
insurgency to eradicate these values.87
Using the tenets of poverty and social alienation theory, religious fundamentalism
theory and theoretical postulates of Neuburger, Valentini & Hughes, Hafez, and Gurr.88 One
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would be better equipped for the discussion of Boko Haram’s insurgency and the Nigerian
Government’s counterinsurgency. Based on these theories, it is not difficult to build a
conceptual framework for the purposes of this project. Therefore, Boko Haram’s terrorists
actions is a reactionary to factors like illiteracy, poverty, misconception of religion and bad
governance. Changing these conditions, the Government would have to tackle the problems
of poor governance, reinforce security and good economic standing and education among
Nigerian citizens, especially within the most affected places in the Northern part of Nigeria.

3.1. METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this project relies heavily on analyzing facts and secondary
sources. This will bring about the understanding and visible conclusion of the questions that
are proposed and asked in the project topic. Furthermore, it bases its discussion with
observers and analysis based on the linkage between poor socio economic conditions such as
poverty, illiteracy, corruption and poor social infrastructure to violence and extremism.
Analysis of historical development of violence in Nigeria will help in understanding the
motivation and the driving force behind Boko Haram.
The discussion of the debate on Boko Haram revolves around the following: the rise
of Boko Haram and the main objective of its members, the response of government and its
failure to tackle the insurgency. Like any research methodology, the one employed for this
research project is not without limitations. Among the limitations of this research is the
objectivity and subjectivity of the participants.
Secondary sources will be used extensively throughout the rest of the project. Overall,
there has been no problem in gathering secondary data, as there is a wealth of information
about each of the areas under investigation: insurgency tactics and counterinsurgency tactics,
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Boko Haram’s history and its activities. Likewise, even though the counterinsurgent fight
against Boko Haram evolves rapidly, researchers highlight this evolution in a timely manner.
3.2 HYPOTHESES:

Insurgency is a combination of socioeconomic disparity among individuals and poor
governance.
The gap between the Northern and Southern states in terms of development and poverty
levels gave rise to the terrorists group. Boko Haram and its increasing attacks in Nigeria,
especially in the North-East of the country, are largely attributable to the lack of
development, high incidence of poverty, general illiteracy, persistent corruption and bad
governance not only in the region but in Nigeria as a whole. In order to tackle this problem,
Nigeria needs to reform its governing system to defeat Boko Haram. Indeed, military
operations may decapitate the group’s leadership and temporarily minimize its attacks, they
will ultimately be insufficient to defeat the group altogether. As a problem rooted in
underlying socioeconomic problems, ineffective management of the Boko Haram insurgency
will not be defeated until the problem of poor governance and other related problems are
tackled. Only in this case will the government’s counterinsurgency measures achieve really
meaningful results.
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Chapter 4:
ANALYSIS OF BOKO HARAM’S STRATEGY
According to the generally accepted definition, strategy is a general plan of achieving
something over a long period of time. First of all, this definition implies the existence of a
goal to be achieved. There is overwhelming agreement among the experts that Boko Haram’s
strategy combines elements of strategies that are usually espoused by insurgent armies and
terrorist groups. As an insurgent army, Boko Haram intends to disrupt the legitimacy of the
Federal Government and to topple it. It has other long-term goals as well. It appears from
secondary literature that Boko Haram’s overarching goal is to establish an Islamic state in
Nigeria. As a terrorist group, Boko Haram intends to achieve political instability in the
country by means of their activities which in turn make the populace question the legitimacy
and credibility of their Government. Likewise, as a terrorist group, Boko Haram aims to
instill terror in Nigerians who seek to question the group’s motives, legitimacy and intentions.
To achieve its objective, Boko Haram has a comparatively comprehensive strategy.
Importantly, as the experts have agreed, the group does not hope to achieve its goals
immediately. On the contrary, it has settled into the strategy of a “long war”. This long war
begins with the recruitment of new members.89 Playing with the feelings of the disillusioned
Nigerian youths – who are largely neglected by the authorities – Boko Haram disseminates its
ideology and converts new members. This task is one of the most important for the group, the
experts agree. Indeed, without new recruits, the group would not be able to maintain its
vitality and, hence, to continue its actions on the path towards achieving its strategy.
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With sufficient recruitment ensured, Boko Haram resorts to its major insurgent actions
– attacking Governmental offices and other Governmental targets. However, as a terrorist
group, Boko Haram does not recoil from the use of purely terrorist strategies, such as
attacking civilian targets: schools, mosques and churches, bus stations.
Importantly, as most other insurgent groups won’t to do, Boko Haram abstains from
direct skirmishes with the counterinsurgent forces. Instead, it prefers to blend with peaceful
civilians in the face of the concerted counterinsurgent operations.90 Its vitality and resilience
lies in the group’s ability to hide and later resurface to intimidate, terrorize and otherwise
threaten local communities. Following a class insurgent strategy, Boko Haram seeks to coerce
the population and undermine federal law-enforcement and security bodies on its home turf.
Because the group conducts its activities mainly in the territories it well knows, it is able to
achieve success.91 As the Government’s counterinsurgency measures were sometimes in
discriminatory, the Government loses credibility in the eyes of local communities and Boko
Haram gains ground. 92
4.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCY

The concept of insurgency remains a largely debated term with often emotional exchanges
because of the varying perspectives and positions of the concept diverge. Baluwaife explains,
“It has been a global phenomenon, particularly in the Nigerian State with the emergence of
groups such as the Niger-Delta ethnic militants in the South-South, Oodu’a People’s
Congress (OPC) in the South West, Bakassi Boys and Movement for the Sovereign State of
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Biafra (MASSOB) in the South East that its approach is to unleash force to maintain order.”93
The Boko Haram in particular continue giving media insurgency publicity with their deadly
actions such as kidnappings, killings, bombing, as well as disruption of public peace.
Insurgent activities such as those of the Boko Haram count on the media as a tool of
insurgency.94
The Boko Haram exhibit the characteristics of insurgent behavior according to their
size, regionalism, goals, tactics, its impact on the international community, and the very
character of the Nigerian regime it challenges according to Gompert and Gordon “Many
insurgencies also exhibit a combination of these characteristics or such may evolve during the
course of the conflict. In line with the base of supporters, John Mackinlay developed the
typologies of insurgencies into lumpen, clan, popular and global.”95 From this demographic
profile of the insurgent specificity of their goals there stands five typologies:

1. Revolutionary insurgencies seek to replace the existing political order with an entirely
different system, often entailing transformation of the economic and social structures.
2. Reformist insurgencies do not aim to change the existing political order but, instead,
seek to compel the Government to alter its policies or undertake political, economic,
or social reforms.
3. Separatist insurgencies seek independence for a specific region. In some cases, the
region in question spans existing national boundaries.
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4. Resistance insurgencies seek to compel an occupying power to withdraw from a given
territory.
5. Commercialist insurgencies are motivated by the acquisition of wealth or material
resources; political power is simply a tool for seizing and controlling access to the
wealth.96

According to the 2012 ‘Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency’ published by the US
Government, insurgencies seek to accomplish the following – Undercut the ability of the
Government to provide the population security and public services, including utilities,
education, and justice. An insurgent group may attempt to supplant the Government by
providing alternative services to the people, or it may be content to portray the Government
as impotent. – Obtain the active or passive support of the population. Not all support has to
be –or is likely to be – gained from true sympathizers; fear and intimidation can gain the
acquiescence of many people. Provoke the Government into committing abuses that drive
neutral civilians toward the insurgents and solidify the loyalty of insurgent supporters.
Undermine international support for the Government and, if possible, gain international
recognition or assistance for the insurgency.97
Consequently, the view of the insurgent emerges as a committed group within a
nation’s population or the general public seeking alliance with other people for the purpose of
achieving their goals. The counterinsurgent represents the Government and all measures
taken by it to stop and eradicate activities of the terrorist group. In Nigeria the insurgent tag
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applies to Boko Haram and the counterinsurgent applies to the measures taken by Nigerian
Government. As explained by Liolio, “The success of both parties thus lies on their ability to
successfully persuade the general public.”98 Others describes this build-up of rebels or
terrorists as an attempt at discrediting a nation’s reigning Government through covert and
overt efforts of breaking down a Government’s ability to providing national security and
services to the populace.99 The poverty plaguing Nigeria poses the framework of the
insurgency in Nigeria but its actions exacerbate the situation by literally stopping any sense
of the Government having the ability to provide people security in their homes, their children
in schools, places of worship, and literally all aspects of life worth living.100 In light of
insurgency practices maintaining a specific goal also looks at its methodology in achieving
this goal as internal products of the society they wreak terror and typically by use of force.
The fact the modern characteristics of insurgent warfare evolved to use of protracted
strategies without any identified front of activity, frames the unconventional and asymmetric
methods of their tactics usually underpinned by guerrilla strategies as explained by
Spooner.101
4.2. TACTICS AND STRATEGIES

The tactics employed by insurgents are largely drawn from the strategies found linked
to the people’s war according to the development by the Chinese Marxist-Leninist
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revolutionary/ political leader, Premier Mao Tse-Tung (1893–1976) as the most pre-eminent
analyst of revolutionary warfare. McCuen explains center to the methods of people’s war are
organizing, control of specific geographic regions serving the needs of the insurgents,
institutionalizing the masses. Then increasing the active numbers of support for the militant
group as well as mobilization of the population with focus on its prime military goal with the
complete annihilation of the counterinsurgency forces.102
Contemporary insurgencies such as the Boko Haram will hide among the Nigerian
population as well as in urban areas subsequently attacking at the slightest opportune
circumstance. “As a matter of fact, today’s insurgencies draw and plan attacks from a loosely
connected networks, often located outside the conflict zones but in urban residential areas.”
103

Although as the fight against Boko Haram continues they have been somewhat pushed out

of the urban areas even though these urban areas remain targets. Coordinating while gaining
expert experience from use of such networking tactics the insurgents also acquire weapons,
clandestine funding, and gain ideological support often from external entities. “In view of this
point, it becomes clear that insurgencies are not carried out by one or two persons but by a
significant amount of persons and this raises the question of why people partake in
insurgencies as well as how insurgents succeed in attracting members of the population into
their struggle.”104 Other considerations look at the causal factors of recruitment.
4.3 CAUSAL FACTORS OF INSURGENT RECRUITMENT
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According to the rationale of Mao, militant insurgents like the Boko Haram develop because
they have the means for planning and carrying out their mobile warfare tactics.105 In addition,
the implications of this shows such a fete requires numerous trained and committed agents to
the cause of insurgency arguing how increasing the quality of increased numbers in the
guerrilla fighting ranks remains the framework of a successful combat campaign.106 At the
same time successfully recruiting the youth it attracts into its violent and deadly activities, the
Boko Haram initiates powerful messages through propaganda imbued with emotional
conviction for their cause.107
By convincing the majority of the poverty stricken, unemployed, and even starving
youth who are normally exploited by politicians for political violence for elections, insurgent
groups such as Boko Haram express claims of how their struggle is for these very recruits and
the rest of the people of Nigeria convincing the targeted youth that by joining their ranks they
indeed prove the hope of the people. Nigeria’s situation proves a classic environment for the
likes of Boko Haram developing and even gaining leverage because of the Government’s
failure to solve the nation’s poverty, economic issues, and failure to find common elements
among the diversity of its cultural, religious, and political factions that compete within the
Nigerian system. For Boko Haram it is their radical interpretation of the Islamic religion that
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frames their message of liberation and rights of the people failing under the current Nigerian
regime.108
4.4 INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY

Originally referred to as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna lidda’awati wal-Jihad meaning People
Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad, Boko Haram became the
widely used name of the insurgent group. The group was a locally centered radical Salafist
organization morphing into a Salafi-jihadist militant group after 2009 in the North-East of
Nigeria.109
In the Hausa language, Boko Haram loosely translates, “Western education or
civilization is sinful.” Under the leadership of leader Mohammed Yusuf, the group gained
massive following of extremely impoverished 17 to 30 year olds by 2002. By 2008, a
religious complex with school and mosque was built in Nigeria’s Northern city of Maiduguri
propagating and indoctrinating members in the group’s belief system.110
The Boko Haram group belief of any association with Western or Western Influenced
Nations means associating with sin. Its attitude toward the Nigerian religious leanings and its
socio-cultural identity reflects the Western influence. This results in what many experts
believe will be a difficulty for true Islam to flourish according to Marshall and Shea.111
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According to Liolio, Boko Haram in Nigeria is no longer just an internal threat to
Nigeria but now threatens the global security due to its increased violence and deadly attacks
on the gamut of lives and institutions. Their destruction and killings extend into neighboring
countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Mali. In Cameroon, churches were set ablaze
and missionaries kidnapped and killed. In Niger, Boko Haram attacked prison guards.112
Reinforced with sophisticated-improved weaponry, larger numbers in their well-organized
cadres, guerrilla tactics, and the suicide bombings, Boko Haram continues challenging the
entire 36 states of Nigeria.113 This drastically affects the social-political growth of Nigeria let
alone the economic stability.114 The counter-productive status of Nigeria’s counterinsurgent
attempts at stopping the Boko Haram continues demanding explanation and demands
rethinking counterinsurgency posing an argument as described by Liolio, “…that
counterinsurgency has the propensity of leading to a classical state of terrorism.”115
Baluwaife explains, “Nigeria’s heterogeneity has at some point been regarded as its
strength but it currently (seems) the crack which may cause a predicted break-down.”
Consequently, “The religious cum cultural diversity has always threatened the continued
existence of the Nigerian nation as one entity such that in the past various opinion leaders
have proffered secession as the permanent solution to internal crisis and terrorism in the
country which started rearing its ugly head since the early 2000s.”116 As a result, every
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instance of insurgency activity extols the dissatisfaction with religion and Government in
Nigeria.117 Truthfully, the continued disruption of the Nigerian Government, most recent with
the beginning of the 4th democratic proclamation, major eruptions among the nation’s various
ethnic and minority groups arose because of the federal policies. With the demise of Nigerian
President Yar’adua and the takeover of President Jonathan, Boko Harm took the opportunity
for unleashing another wave of terror and mayhem in its occupied Northern Nigeria. While
the message of Boko Haram (even the meaning of their name) is anti-everything Western,
some experts believe the current activities are far more politically motivated than ever. The
disruption of life for the Nigerian people where Boko Haram attacked school, churches, and
mosques have uprooted the people leaving the insecure Northern Nigeria resulting in a
national state of emergency by the Nigerian Government in some of the affected Northern
States.118
The irony of the entire insurgency having foundations in poverty because of a weak
Government and GNP with rampant unemployment arises from the state of affairs and
insecure parts of Northern Nigeria is the main reason foreign investors stay away. This
continues hindering of the nation’s economic growth despite oil exploration continuing
giving the prospects of investment some unknown future possibility.119 Baluwaife describes
how, “Several business owners have closed down their businesses and workers have relocated
from their places leaving several work places deserted and reducing the means of livelihood
of people caught up in the affected areas and increasing poverty in the nation.”120 The
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continued rise of the death toll in Northern Nigeria from twenty to one hundred and fifty
every time Boko Haram attacks and consequently adds to the disillusionment among the
population of the credibility of the Nigerian adequately protecting the lives of the citizens
along with hindering basic life services in the region that include schools and health care.121
Since the Northern region of Nigeria is the major producer of the nation’s food, Boko
Haram insurgent activities effectively reduce crops and harvesting resulting in hike in food
price. The reality according to Baluwaife is, “Although Nigeria, the giant of Africa, describes
her heterogeneity as a situation of ‘Unity in Diversity’, it has become one of violence and
terror” along with loss of “property, high level(s) of insecurity, food shortage, price hikes,
poverty, and stunted economic growth.”122
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400+ fatalities

50 to 399 fatalities

Less than 50 fatalities

States under

emergency
Source: http://www.latimes.com/visuals/graphics/la-fg-g-boko-haram-20140707
htmlstory.html
4.5 BOKO HARAM’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Reportedly, prior to 2009, the Boko Haram group without a clear political or organizational
structure little intelligence existed about its control system and command hierarchy.
According to Liolio, by 2011–2012 the organizational structure of the militant group was
made up of complex cell structures locally and internationally. Approximately 26 cells have
regional commanders. These same leaders take their orders from the top command leader
Abubakar Shekau.123

Retrieved: http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/pdf/case-studies/Samson_Eyituoyo_Liolio__Rethinking_Counterinsurgency.pdf .
123

44

These demographics show the Boko Haram led by a highly trained and sophisticated
leadership structure managing specialized departments. As a result, these departments include
specialization such as, “bomb manufacturing, suicide bombers, intelligence, research,
welfare/healthcare and other logistics needed for proper execution of their goals.” At the
same time, reports indicate top level decisions take place within the Boko Haram by the
“Shura Council.”124 Again, the significance of this key knowledge about the Boko Haram
indicates they remain a loosely constructed organization and this proves problematic for
counter-insurgent actions having effective outcomes making rethinking counter-insurgency
tactics against the Boko Haram a clearly poignant reality.125
4.6 RETHINKING COUNTER-INSURGENCY

The demographics show that Boko Haram is proving problematic for the counter-insurgent
measures used by the Nigerian Government and supportive international forces. Therefore,
we must consider other options in rethinking the current counter-insurgent program. A
number of examples may prove a better choice. The following provide a review of the
options.
A study reviewing the terrorist activities of the last 40 years completed by the RAND
Corporation found the majority of these insurgents were destroyed through intelligence
agencies combined with policing, they joined the political process or disbanded their group
with arrests or killing off key members. The fact is, according to this report, military force
typically proves rarely successful in ending terrorist activities or their groups. Turkey is
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known for embracing international cooperative techniques addressing its counter-insurgent
operations through the development of its massive intelligence network with its current
standings through the Turkish National Police and 59 countries signing 99 Security
Cooperation Agreements. At the same time, Turkey places great importance using its counterinsurgent units over the use of full military force, claiming the units record reports foiling a
number of terrorist organizations’ planned attacks.126
Accordingly, the Turkish counter-insurgent units remain supported by highly
developed counter-insurgent institutions including the Counter-Terrorism Academy
(TEMAK) and the Intelligence Academy (ISAK) with intelligence department training.
Outcomes of these efforts now show over 100 counter-intelligence and anti-terrorism books
published about the assessment incorporating scientific methods in evaluating the operational
experiences carried out in counter-insurgency activities.127 The Nigerian Boko Haram
religious ideology motivating their insurgent militant activities poses another factor in
general in initiating counter-insurgent models.
The Boko Haram spurred by misinterpreted religious and political ideologies
exemplifies why some countries use a moderate advocacy for addressing social ills as in the
case of Morocco 2013 National Strategy. In the Moroccan situation they promoted inter and
intra-religious dialogue allowing the Government assisting in building critical trust within
and between public institutions and diverse societies existing in the predominantly Muslim
nation. The effectiveness of this approach proved so in preventing abuse of religion by
militants as well as allowing the development of radicalism.128
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Algeria taking a similar approach developed programs for religious guidance aimed at
endorsing peace, respect, and tolerance for human rights with the intention of countering any
ideologies exploiting existing disenchantment within the Algerian society at its root causes.
Leaders such as Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta demonstrated this approach addressing
the nation last December urging Muslims to unify with the country reminding them Islam
remains a religion of peace. Having some of the most moderate Muslim faction among
African nations, Kenya may prove successful in creating such a platform sustaining against
insurgent penetration.129
Use of the law as a counter-insurgent technique in Nigeria against the Boko Haram
could serve an important counter-insurgent plan in dealing with the specific characteristics
proving problematic in halting the militant horror of Boko Haram. The idea of using the law
means instead of outright killing the militants they are processed according to the law
punishing those responsible. The intention is the law becomes the deterrent while showing
the Nigerian Government respects all diversity of groups within the nation and holds all equal
under the law. By doing so, the act of securing the rights of defendants under the due process
of the law having a fair trial disproves any misperceptions about the Government
discriminating against any particular groups.130
Any chance of long term peace, looks at the critical aspect of undermining the
insurgent factions of Boko Haram showing the Nigerian Government intends and does
protect its citizens feeling marginalized using violence as its last resort as so clearly those
factions in the Northern States of Nigeria fraught with acute poverty and unemployment
continue experiencing. In rethinking the counter-insurgent tactics in addressing the Boko

129

Ibid.

130

Ibid.

47

Haram it remains prudent considering the challenges Nigeria experiences with its internal
security according to Udounwa.131
Nigeria’s internal security challenges have roots in its history, geopolitical structure,
ethno-religious composition, and slow socio-economic development. American Military
University scholar Lawrence Cline identified British colonial rule and its forced merger of
disparate ethnic groups to create Nigeria as a foundational cause for insecurity in Nigeria.132
The Nigerian Defense Academy Professor Etham Mijah observed that the structural
imbalance in the ethnic, religious, regional, and political composition of Nigeria and the
manipulation of such identities for political power is another reason for violence in the
country.133 A Northeastern University scholar William Miles asserted that politicians often
create ethnic and religious identities to achieve political advantage. Other observers have
attributed recurring violence in the country to economic inequality. 134 A poll conducted in
2001 showed religion (25 percent), socio-economic issues (22 percent) and ethnicity (18
percent) as the major causes of violence and insecurity in Nigeria.135
The resilience and rapid growth of Boko Haram was spurred by these three factors.
Political patronage and support from politicians and high ranking Government officials who
exploited the group for personal and electoral purposes. Others have argued how introduction
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of Sharia law in some Northern States as early as 1999 resulted in conferring a kind of
legitimacy on the insurgents. Decades ago in the 30-month civil war of 1970 was the last time
Nigeria experiences such an internal security challenge as the Boko Haram now poses.136
The Iranian revolution success in 1979 proved inspirational to Nigeria’s various
religious groups such as the Maitatsine calling for the imposition of Sharia Law across
Nigeria.137 The Maitatsine agitation was encouraged by the return to civilian rule after
General Olusegun Obasanjo handed-over to an elected civilian government in the same
year.138 While the Government using the military took action in May of 1980 repressing the
Maitatsine threat it nonetheless re-emerged in the mid-2000s still existing today the majority
of the Northern most states of Nigeria. “Boko Haram appears to be a more violent mutation
of these earlier groups. Boko Haram’s ideological narrative describes a Nigerian version of
the global jihadist agenda with deeper roots in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”139 Understanding
the demographics prodding the Boko Haram as far as character, motivating, and causal
factors prove argumentative and diverse.
Further, “It is also suggested that avoiding situations that could lead to insurgency is
better than trying to counter one… (Suggesting) social-political and economic reforms as
well as amnesty programs as measures if heavily invested in, to help curb Boko Haram as
well as insurgency in general.”140 The religious aspects of the Boko Haram militant stance
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has its own considerations as well. The fact there exists religious underpinnings to the Boko
Haram activities as explained by Spooner having the goal of bringing the strict Sharia law in
Nigeria shows them intolerant and promoting sectarian and isolation as part of their terrorist
methodology. The ineffective efforts of the Nigerian Government solely focusing on a
military counter-insurgent policy is not only intrinsically problematic but leaves little room
for realistic outcomes. The insecure aspects of the Government itself leaves the Nigerian
nation almost a pawn in the hands of the Boko Haram.
As with the majority of third world nations experiencing insurgent and militant
uprisings, there exists a weak central Government. This is surely the case in Nigeria with the
insurgent activities of the Boko Haram remaining a social plague in this nation. The Nigerian
Government narrow approach to counter-insurgency relying heavily on the military is a major
hindrance in its efforts. Little outside effort including that of the U.S. assisting in the counterinsurgency tactics of the Nigerian Government has few ways of contributing to effective
strategies as long as the political dynamics of this troubled nation continue. A recent study by
McQuaid and Asfuca-Heim sees the efforts of nations, including the U.S. supporting the
counter-insurgent efforts to thwart Boko Haram take place in Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.141
In doing so, such efforts have a more realistic opportunity for preventing Boko Haram from
taking root within these national borders where so much of the Nigerian Boko Haram
recruitment continues. “While this would not dismantle Boko Haram in the near term, it
could buy time for conditions in Nigeria to become more favorable to direct U.S. (and other
international supportive) assistance.”142 Further implications of the McQuaid and Asfura-
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Heim study and analysis of rethinking the current Nigerian counter-insurgency methodology
deserve consideration including a divergent approach.
Such a methodology is considered the most realistic for counter-insurgency according
to McQuaid and Asfura-Heim.143 With the lack of success of the current counter-insurgency
approaches to defeating Boko Haram because of its ability for expansion, adaptability, and
development of new and more lethal capabilities despite the efforts of the Nigerian
Government and its international allies including the U.S. dismantling them. Clearly, current
approaches to defeating Boko Haram have not proven to be the most pragmatic approach.
From this point of fact, the insurgency conflict of Boko Haram from a counterinsurgency perspective must focus on the collaboration of regional partners deciding the
continued pursuit of a strategy with the final approach requiring all stakeholders regularly
conducting military operations or any other counter-insurgent steps within the Nigerian
nation so it adheres to the analysis above thus avoiding the ongoing Nigerian Government
actions that only perpetuate the conflict. “For example, if the military of Chad conducts
additional kinetic operations within Nigeria, it must do so in a way that avoids human rights
abuses and civilian casualties.144 The bigger picture looks at the counterinsurgency activities
of Africa as a whole.
In general, the African counter-insurgency (AFRICOM) tactics having a role and
mission could take a more leading position by implementing regional preventative
approaches to Boko Haram:
It should build on existing relationships with Chad, Niger, and Cameroon
to coordinate a focused response aimed at preventing Boko Haram from
spreading. It should integrate relevant civilian agencies in supporting
roles. Currently, by virtue of existing threats on the continent, AFRICOM
is already pursuing many of the activities required to support this
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approach. For the most part, any change to AFRICOM’s current approach
would involve shifting existing current activities, exercises, and operations
that involve Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, and tailoring them—to the extent
possible—so that they directly support capacity-building efforts to prevent
Boko Haram from taking hold.145

Managing the existing relationship of the AFRICOM with the Nigerian Government
requires pressuring the leadership in the nation’s capital of Abuja. This means the Nigerian
Government needs formal integration with France and any of the other international partners
willing to work such a regional approach. Further to the assessment of their study, McQuaid
and Asfuca-Heim, found that due to the Nigerian Government’s continued reluctance, taking
a bolder and effective counter-insurgent approach to the conflict suggests a particular focus of
the U.S. meeting its own national security goals then must stop relying on Nigeria. The U.S.
putting its efforts into strengthening its regional allies’ counter-insurgent activities and
abilities on the Boko Haram ensuring blocking the group from further spread and potential
destabilization of Nigerian neighbors. In this manner, such a shift affords a focused and
immediate proactive stance by the U.S. against the continuing and growing threat of Boko
Haram.146
At the same time, the U.S. continues working with Nigeria with an anticipation the
nation’s political leaders hopefully shift the current perspectives of the Boko Haram conflict
to another that embraces realistic results. In such a manner, the U.S. holds a better
opportunity in providing the Nigerian Government with assistance and support leading to
measurable counter-insurgent results with the goal of dismantling Boko Haram. “Until then,
focusing on a regional, preventative strategy appears to be a potentially promising means of
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containing Boko Haram in the short term, while providing time and space for continued
efforts to dismantle and ultimately defeat the group.”147 This detailed rethinking of the
Nigerian Government-led failed counter-insurgency practices against the Boko Haram
provides a sound plan of action. According to McQuaid and Afuca- Heim, “The (U.S.) wants
Nigeria to undertake a more concerted effort to address the conflict through a broad-based
whole-of-Government approach. Given current political, social, and economic dynamics in
Nigeria, combined with endemic corruption, the (Nigerian Government) is unlikely to shift its
approach on a timeline that the US Government will accept due to its own national security
interests.”148

Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Boko Haram owes its vitality to several important factors. The first factor underlying the
Boko Haram insurgency is the lack of national solidarity in the country. Created artificially
by the British Empire in the early 20th century, Nigeria is a motley collection of diverse ethnic
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and religious groups. Having conflicting interests, these groups envisage a different future to
the country. When such visions run afoul of the central Government’s vision, the most
intransigent elements of the marginalized groups rely on arms and terror to achieve their
goals.
The spread of fundamental ideologies is yet another reason that undergirds the Boko
Haram insurgency. Although the consulted commentators and experts have largely agreed
that religious misconceptions, in isolation, are insufficient to explain the rise of Boko Haram,
they have argued that ignoring these religious misconceptions would be erroneous as well.
Indeed, this paper has shown that Boko Haram has sought to achieve greater role for their
version of Islam in national affairs. For example, Boko Haram has called for stricter
application of the Sharia law in the national political and judicial systems. Likewise, the
predominantly Sunni Boko Haram has commonly targeted not only Christians but also
Muslims of non-Sunni denominations as well as Sunni who oppose their interpretations of
Islam. Yet, it is imperative that the Boko Haram insurgency should be differentiated from
purely sectarian violence, which has been historically rife in Nigeria.
Importantly, however, this paper has shown that the spread of fundamentalist
ideologies should be analyzed together with other factors explaining the vitality of Boko
Haram. Thus, it has demonstrated that the group has been able to recruit new members and to
continue its deadly activities in the face of the Government’s counterinsurgency efforts,
because of the successive Governments’ inability and/or reluctance to tackle socioeconomic
problems. Indeed, because poverty and unemployment are high in Nigeria, many
disillusioned youths are happy to join the insurgency movement in what they see as a
righteous fight against the corrupt Government. Corruption in Nigeria stands at such a
disastrous level that the socioeconomic conditions of ordinary people are not improving
despite the astonishing economic growth. Because of corrupt and irresponsible officials,
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regular Nigerians do not share in the national wealth. Furthermore, there is a yawning divide
between Nigeria’s North and South. Whereas Southerners are able to reap some benefits of
the country’s economic development, those in the North usually are not. Likewise, illiteracy
in the North is substantially higher than it is in the South. As a result, it is not surprising that
Boko Haram enjoys popularity among many disenchanted illiterate paupers in the country’s
North.
Another reason for the vitality of Boko Haram is that the Government has used
counterinsurgency tactics and seldom considered counterterrorism strategies. The problem is
that Boko Haram is more than an insurgent movement. Employing suicide bomber attacks
and deliberately destroying civilian targets, the group is more of a terrorist group than it is an
insurgent group.
The consulted participants of this study have agreed overwhelmingly that the Boko
Haram insurgency will not burn itself out, as had occasionally happened with other insurgent
movements in Nigeria’s earlier history. Hence, the Government would be wise to make its
current counterinsurgency approach more comprehensive. Based on the information
identified in this paper, it would be logical to identify a series of immediate, mid-term and
long-term recommendations that would help the Nigerian Government to ultimately prevail
over Boko Haram. First of all, several purely political measures are needed:
•

Promote democracy in meaningful and perceptible ways: Democracy does not
extend significantly further than the voting booth in Nigeria. Once elections are over,
elected officials forget about their cavalier promises. Nigerians, however, covet the
trappings of the democratic world. Hence, an important recommendation would be to
promote democracy in Nigeria in meaningful and perceptible ways. This, of course,
would be a long-term recommendation.
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•

Promoting interreligious and intra-religious dialogues: Indeed, even though some
authors question the role of religion in breeding the Boko Haram insurgency, the
reality is different. Above all, it is necessary to foster intra-religious dialogue, because
tensions exist among the country’s Muslims and among the country’s Christians. This
could be both a mid-term recommendation and a long-term recommendation.

•

Building trust in Federal Government Institutions: People do not trust the federal
Government, nor do they trust local Governments. Some Nigerians trust tribal leaders;
others trust the military. Yet, because elected officials seldom get in touch with their
electorate after election, trust in elected authorities is very low. Enhancing
communication between the Government and the masses could help this cause.

Another series of recommendations include measures aimed at preventing insurgency,
so that the country would need to deal with its consequences:
•

To limit the vitality of Boko Haram and to prevent its attacks in the future: The
Government should try to tackle poverty and let people share in the national wealth.
This would be a complicated, long-term task. More specific and immediate measures
would include greater criminal responsibility for corruption and greater investment in
job opportunities. For example, to really curb terrorism, Nigeria could emulate
China’s example and introduce death penalty for corrupt officials. The Government
should also create new jobs to curtail unemployment.

•

Expose, Probe and Prosecute: The Government must expose and prosecute
government officials, politicians and individuals who finance or give any form of
support to the terrorist group. Government officials and individuals who participate in
embezzlement of government funds should be prosecuted in a timely manner as its
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effects will be felt immediately and would go a long in the government’s effort of
trust building.
•

Invest in education to eradicate illiteracy: Education is a key to national
reconciliation in a country as diverse and illiterate as Nigeria. Measures can be taken
immediately, but the results would be felt over the long-term.

•

Study the experience of other nations in tackling insurgency: By scrutinizing the
experiences of other nations, Nigerians will be able to avert some of their mistakes.
The Government should act with dispatch and implement this recommendation
immediately.
This paper has shown that the Government needs to solve the country’s

socioeconomic problems to reduce the vitality of the Boko Haram insurgency. Yet, the
consulted authors and participants have also recognized that the military option should not be
abandoned altogether.
Finally, several military recommendations should also be considered:
•

Increase transparency and accountability of officials in charge of the
counterinsurgency operations: After all, Boko Haram leaders are sometimes able to
bribe these officials, thereby hampering the counterinsurgency progress. The heads of
security agencies have been accused of embezzlement. The influence of such a step
would be felt immediately.

•

Employ counterterrorism tactics in the fight against Boko Haram: Indeed, the
group’s atrocities have more features of terrorism than insurgency. Even with a
Muslim candidate winning the elections in 2015, Boko Haram has not stopped its
subversive activities, meaning that it was not simply an insurgency against the widely
criticized Jonathan administration due to his religious creed.
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•

Strengthen cooperation with other regional states threatened by Boko Haram
and with international partners.

•

Amnesty for Boko Haram Members: The Government should seriously look in to
giving amnesty for terrorist members who willing disarm and should also be
integrated back into the society after concluding a de-radicalization program.

•

Hold and rebuild areas after their liberation from Boko Haram: Instead of
retreating from the areas after clearing them, the Government should stay to cement
tentative gains and to defeat Boko Haram, ruling out the possibility of resurgence.

Should the Nigerian Government follow all these recommendation, it would be able
to win the war against Boko Haram. Were the socioeconomic conditions in Nigeria to
improve, Boko Haram would lose its appeal among greater swathes of its members and
sympathizers. Boko Haram ideologues would not abandon their principles, but the group
would certainly lose the support of the disillusioned Nigerians. Likewise, destroying Boko
Haram would, either directly or by circumstance, help the country solve many other
persisting problems.
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